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<rss:title>Collective Decision-Making</rss:title>
<rss:link>http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-cdm</rss:link>
<rss:description>Collective Decision-Making</rss:description>
<dc:date>2026-11-09</dc:date>
<rss:items><rdf:Seq><rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13120&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fuez5_v1&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1212025&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm"/>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td706&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm"/>
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<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13120&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm">
<rss:title>Cloud Voting</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13120&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm</rss:link>
<rss:description>We introduce Cloud Voting, a constitutional rule allocating final authority between citizens and parliament according to turnout of voters. Costly information acquisition and differential participation can make turnout informative about issue magnitude and institutional reliability. We characterize when optimal turnout-contingent authority takes a threshold form. Low parliamentary bias yields an optimal parliament-to-citizen threshold. With moderate bias, turnout can signal parliamentary reliability, and optimal authority can be nonmonotone. Holding information acquisition and participation fixed, the optimal turnout-only rule weakly lowers expected policy loss relative to either fixed-authority benchmark, with strict improvements when each institution is strictly preferable at supported turnout levels.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Hans Gersbach</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Elias Kolleck</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>direct democracy, representative democracy, constitution, co-voting, biases, information asymmetry</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fuez5_v1&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm">
<rss:title>The Accountability of Missed Opportunities: Electoral punishments from public infrastructure expansion.</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fuez5_v1&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm</rss:link>
<rss:description>Can public goods expansion generate electoral backlash against incumbents? Do voters hold incumbents accountable for policies from which they derive no direct benefit? Conventional accountability models suggest that public goods provision rewards incumbents, yet the dynamics through which grievances translate into punishment remain both theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexplored. This paper explores how infrastructure construction can provoke voter backlash in areas unaffected by new developments. Infrastructure provision has inherent characteristics that create particular scenarios for accountability. The visibility and salience of infrastructure, coupled with its differentiated, non-universal spatial impacts and slow expansion, set the stage for territorial competition across constituencies. When policymakers decide the location of new facilities, non-winners are confronted with a tangible counterfactual: the opportunity to enhance their own situation. The perception of having missed a chance to benefit—rather than material loss per se—is at the core of their grievance and becomes the main motivation to punish the incumbent responsible. Using a novel dataset on hospital construction in Spain (2002–2019) and municipality-level electoral results, I analyze how the allocation of 81 new hospitals affected support for regional incumbents. Compared with regions without hospital expansion, municipalities whose accessibility improved increased their support for the incumbent by 2.14 percentage points, whereas non-impacted municipalities reduced it by 1.85 points. Punishments manifest both as lower turnout (-2.26 pp) and as gains for opposition parties (+0.81 pp). Contrary to expectations, however, these punishments do not vary with prior accessibility. This study provides insights into nuanced electoral dynamics around public goods, emphasizing the critical role of unequal allocations in shaping electoral accountability.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>San Román del Pozuelo, Álvaro</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2026-10-22</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1212025&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm">
<rss:title>Mayors within Electoral or Legislative Coalitions? Pre-Electoral Agreements in Brazilian Municipal Legislatures</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1212025&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm</rss:link>
<rss:description>This work examines whether parties politically connected to the elected mayor have a higher probability of securing the local council presidency at the beginning of the legislative cycle. Results underscore that the support of the Executive branch has a significant causal e!ect on the choice of the local Speaker. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that, in Municipalities, the government based on legislative coalitions observed at the federal level falls behind a mechanism of pre-electoral agreements, especially electoral coalitions. Taking advantage of these agreements, mayors influence the choice of the local council president, which allows the Executive to o!set the absence of institutions that are inherent to the legislative coalition government. To investigate this issue, we assembled a novel dataset on the party a"liation of more than 3, 600 Brazilian local councils in 2021, which we paired with a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) based on the 2020 mayoral elections in Brazil.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Roberto Aragão Neto</dc:creator>
<dc:date>2025-11-21</dc:date>
</rss:item>
<rss:item rdf:about="https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td706&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm">
<rss:title>Bringing Virtue Back: How Domestic and International Factors Shape Presidential Success in Latin America</rss:title>
<rss:link>https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdp:texdis:td706&amp;r=&amp;r=cdm</rss:link>
<rss:description>To what extent can Latin American presidents turn economic policy choices into electoral success in economies vulnerable to global fluctuations? This paper revisits the debate on economic voting and democratic accountability in the region, challenging the view that external forces predominantly determine incumbents' electoral fortunes. We code a dataset of presidential elections in Latin America since democratisation and examine how domestic macroeconomic conditions shape the electoral continuity of political projects, while accounting for global economic conditions. Our findings show that domestic policy choices matter. Higher public expenditure increases the likelihood of electoral success, but this effect depends on public debt levels. In countries with low or moderate debt, fiscal expansion can be an effective electoral strategy. Under high indebtedness, its electoral returns vanish or even turn negative. These findings suggest that presidential success in Latin America is not merely a matter of luck, but also of policy choices, albeit made under economic and political constraints.</rss:description>
<dc:creator>Helena Morais</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Rafael Ribeiro</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Fernanda Cimini</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>economic vote; Latin America; reelections; policy space.</dc:subject>
<dc:date>2026-11</dc:date>
</rss:item>
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