Network Economics
http://lists.repec.orgmailman/listinfo/nep-net
Network Economics
2016-10-02
Multi-layered interbank model for assessing systemic risk
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20161944&r=net
In this paper, we develop an agent-based multi-layered interbank network model based on a sample of large EU banks. The model allows for taking a more holistic approach to interbank contagion than is standard in the literature. A key finding of the paper is that there are material non-linearities in the propagation of shocks to individual banks when taking into account that banks are related to each other in various market segments. The contagion effects when considering the shock propagation simultaneously across multiple layers of interbank networks can be substantially larger than the sum of the contagion-induced losses when considering the network layers individually. In addition, a bank “systemic importance” measure based on the multi-layered network model is developed and is shown to outperform standard network centrality indicators. The finding of non-linear contagion effects when accounting for the interaction between the different layers of banks’ interlinkages have important policy implications. For example, it provides an argument for separating banks’ trading activities from their other intermediation activities. JEL Classification: C45, C63, D85, G21
Montagna, Mattia
Kok, Christoffer
Financial contagion, interbank market, network theory
2016-08
Urban Networks: Connecting Markets, People, and Ideas
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:15-078&r=net
Should China build mega-cities or a network of linked middle-sized metropolises? Can Europe's mid-sized cities compete with global agglomeration by forging stronger inter-urban links? This paper examines these questions within a model of recombinant growth and endogenous local amenities. Three primary factors determine the trade-off between networks and big cities: local returns to scale in innovation, the elasticity of housing supply, and the importance of local amenities. Even if there are global increasing returns, the returns to local scale in innovation may be decreasing, and that makes networks more appealing than mega-cities. Inelastic housing supply makes it harder to supply more space in dense confines, which perhaps explains why networks are more popular in regulated Europe than in the American Sunbelt. Larger cities can dominate networks because of amenities, as long as the benefits of scale overwhelm the downsides of density. In our framework, the skilled are more likely to prefer mega-cities than the less skilled, and the long-run benefits of either mega-cities or networks may be quite different from the short-run benefits.
Glaeser, Edward L.
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
Zou, Yimei
2015-12
Systemic risk and the dynamics of temporary financial networks
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:67810&r=net
This paper has two main objectives: first, to provide a formal definition of endogenous systemic risk that is firmly grounded in equilibrium dynamics of temporary financial networks (i.e., short-term lending and investment networks); and second, to construct a discounted stochastic game (DSG) model of the emergence of equilibrium network dynamics that fully takes into account the feedback between network structure, strategic behavior, and risk. Based on our definition of systemic risk we also propose a formal definition of tipping points. Using these tools we provide a strategic approach to making global assessments of systemic risk in temporary financial networks. Our approach is based on three key facts: (1) the equilibrium dynamics which emerge from the game of network formation generate finitely many disjoint basins of attraction as well as finitely many ergodic measures (implying that, starting from any temporary financial network, in finite time with probability one, the dynamic sequence of networks arrives at one of these basins, and once there, stays there), (2) each basin of attraction is homogenous with respect to its default characteristics (meaning that if a basin contains networks having a particular set of defaulted players, then all networks contained in this basin have the same set of defaulted players), and (3) the unique profile of basins generated by the equilibrium dynamics carries with it a unique set of tipping points (special networks) - and these tipping points provide an early warning of network failure.
Rui Gong
Frank Page
systemic risk; counter-party risk; financial networks; supernetworks; tipping points; default cascades; basins of attraction; Pareto optimal stationary Markov equilibrium; first passage probabilities; hitting times; hitting time probabilities.
2016-07
Allocation rules for coalitional network games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01301981&r=net
Coalitional network games are real-valued functions defined on a set of players organized into a network and a coalition structure. We adopt a flexible approach assuming that players organize themselves the best way possible by forming the efficient coalitional network structure. We propose two allocation rules that distribute the value of the efficient coalitional network structure: the atom-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule and the player-based flexible coalitional network allocation rule.
Jean-François Caulier
Ana Mauleon
Vincent Vannetelbosch
cooperative game theory, allocation rules,Coalition, Networks
2015-11
Interbank loans, collateral and modern monetary policy
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20161959&r=net
This study develops a novel agent-based model of the interbank market with endogenous credit risk formation mechanisms. We allow banks to exchange funds through unsecured and secured transactions in order to facilitate the flow of funds to the most profitable investment projects. Our model confirms basic stylized facts on (i) bank balance sheet distributions, (ii) interbank interest rates and (iii) interbank lending volumes, for both the secured and the unsecured market segments. We also find that network structures within the secured market segment are characterized by the presence of dealer banks, while we do not observe similar patterns in the unsecured market. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of our model for analysing a number of policy scenarios. JEL Classification: C63, E17, E47, E58
Wolski, Marcin
van de Leur, Michiel
agent-based models, collateral, interbank lending, networks, repo
2016-09