http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-net Network Economics 2012-02-01 Yi-Nung Yang http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hub:wpecon:201108&r=net We propose a class of sharing rules for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for partition function games with externalities. We show that this class of sharing rules is characterized by three axioms: coalitional efficiency, additivity and anonimity which are adapted to the context of partition function games. The sharing rules stabilize, in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983), the coalition which generates the highest global welfare among the set of potentially internally stable coalitions. The new class of sharing rules is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation (outsiders benefit from the expansion of the coalition) and which therefore often suffer from free-riding. Eyckmans, Johan, Finus, Michael, Mallozzi, Lina 2011-07 partition function; coalition formation; externalities; surplus http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:41&r=net Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership. -- Stühmeier, Torben, Wenzel, Tobias 2012 media markets,two-sided markets