Game Theory
http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-gth
Game Theory2014-03-30Laszlo A. KoczyStable lexicographic rules for shortest path games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-45&r=gth
For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate cost shares to the players according to some lexicographic preference relation. The average of all such lexicographic rules is shown to satisfy many desirable properties (core selection, symmetry, demand additivity,...). Our method relates to what Tijs et. al (2011) refer to as the Alexia value. We propose a procedure allowing to compute these lexicographic allocations for any shortest path game.Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau2014shortest path, core, algorithm, lexicographic minimaStrategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource Under Rational Learning About its Reproduction
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-06&r=gth
We build a workable game of common-property resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the reproduction prospects of a resource. We focus on Markov-perfect strate- gies under truthful revelation of beliefs. For reasonable initial conditions, exogenously shif- ting the prior beliefs of one player towards more pressimism about the potential of natural resources to reproduce, can create anti-conservation incentives. The single player whose be- liefs have been shifted towards mor pessimism exhibits higher exploitation rate than before. In response, all other players reduce their exploitation rates in order to conserve the resource. However, the overall conservation incentive is weak, making the aggregate exploitation rate higher than before the pessimistic shift in beliefs of that single player. Due to this weakness in strategic conservation responses, if the number of players is relatively small, then in cases with common priors, jointly shifting all players' beliefs more pessimism exacerbates the commons problem.Christos Koulovatianos2014renewable resources,resource exploitation, non-cooperative dynamic games, Bayesian learning, stochstic games, commons, rational learning, uncertainty, beliefsHouse Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-05&r=gth
We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.EHLERS, Lars, KLAUS, Bettina2013Deferred-acceptance-algorithm, indivisible objects allocation, resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofnessA Characterization of Exact Non-atomic Market Games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-09&r=gth
Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive measures, which is of independent interest.AMARANTE, Massimiliano2013Lower/upper envelopes; separation theorem; exact games; non-atomic market gamesAn algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-12&r=gth
We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.ANDERSSON, Tommy, EHLERS, Lars2013Least manipulable envy-free rules; algorithmEquilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_04&r=gth
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profi?le that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct experiments to test the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in two applications: a game of vertical multi-lateral contracting, and a game of electoral competition. We fi?nd that our selection criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.Jon X. Eguia, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Rebecca Morton, Antonio Nicolò2014-03imperfect information, equilibrium selection, passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs, vertical contract- ing, multiple equilibriaThreshold Effects in Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/150173&r=gth
Renaud Foucart, Grégoire Garsous2013-10climate change; self-enforcing international agreements; threshold effectsGender differences and stereotypes in the beauty contest
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2014-13&r=gth
Recent literature has emphasized that individuals display different depths of reasoning when playing games. In this paper, we explore gender differences in strategic sophistication and study whether these differences are endogenous. We report results from two different experiments employing the beauty contest. In the first, large study, we show that females react very strongly to incentives to the extent that gender differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. In the second study, we use a within subject design to analyze how depth of reasoning varies with gender priming and the gender composition of the set of players. We corroborate that females display higher levels of sophistication and even overtake males when incentives are provided and gender is primed. On the other hand, males who believe that females are better in the game display higher sophistication when playing against females.María Cubel, Santiago Sanchez-Pages2014Guessing game, strategic sophistication, gender, beliefs, stereotype threatOn the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-11&r=gth
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We study the impact of the merger on the equilibrium production strategies, on the steady states, and on the profitability of the merger for its members. We show that there exists an interval of the asset's stock such that any merger is profitable if the stock at the time the merger is formed falls within that interval. That includes mergers that are known to be unprofitable in the corresponding static equilibrium framework.BENCHEKROUN, Hassan, GAUDET, Gérard2013Mergers; dynamic games; oligopoly; common property; renewable resourcesRobust Competitive Auctions: A Theory of Stable Markets
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2014-04&r=gth
This paper shows that a competitive distribution of auctions (Peters 1997) is robust to the possibility of a seller's deviation to any arbitrary mechanism, let alone any direct mechanism because the sufficient condition for the robustness is embedded in its notion of equilibrium. This sufficient condition is generalized to examine the robustness of equilibrium in any decentralized market institution where competing principals (e.g. sellers) can offer mechanisms only from a set of mechanisms available in that market institution. The equivalence result (Gershkov et al. 2013) between Bayesian incentive compatible direct mechanisms and dominant strategy direct mechanism is also extended to express the generalized sufficient condition in terms of dominant strategy direct mechanisms.Seungjin Han2014-03competitive auctions, robust equilibrium, competing mechanism designAdvances in Auctions
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54656&r=gth
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and applications of auction theory in the two decades since Wilson (1992) wrote the previous Handbook chapter on this topic.Kaplan, Todd R, Zamir, Shmuel2014-03-20Auctions; Private-Value Auctions; Multi-Unit Auctions; All-Pay Auctions; Resale; Position Auctions; Dynamic Auctions; Spectrum Auctions; Monotone EquilibriumPublic Bads, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and the Value of Information
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-13-009&r=gth
This paper develops a simple model of public bads where players have heterogeneous beliefs about the consequence of their collective action. Properties of equilibrium and its relation to beliefs and preference are examined, followed by a detailed investigation of the impacts of new information. Our analysis sheds light on an important trade-off associated with information policies in the presence of belief heterogeneity and ambiguity. In particular, we show that newly available information can unambiguously worsen the free-riding problem even when it better reflects the correct risk than the players’ beliefs. Adding information noise will never mitigate the public-bad nature of the problem if players are equally confident about their beliefs. When the beliefs are highly heterogeneous, however, a certain amount of information noise can be Pareto-improving, for which the degrees of risk and ambiguity aversion play asymmetric roles.Hiroaki Sakamotoexternality; uncertainty; heterogeneous beliefs; informationOn the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games.
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-50a&r=gth
The literature on dictator [D] and joy-of-destruction [JoD] games demonstrates that people can be nice and nasty. We study, by way of an experiment with between-subjects and within-subjects features, to what extent behaviors are context dependent and consistent. We find that, for one-shot D and JoD games, our participants' niceness and nastiness depend on the choice set. Contradicting the observed altruism and nastiness, participants tend to be selfish but nonetheless make choices that increase social welfare when given the opportunity.Le Zhang, Andreas Ortmann2013-11Dictator game, Joy-of-Destruction game, Money burning, Altruism, Nastiness, Efficiency considerations, Mach-IV test