Game Theory
http://lists.repec.orgmailman/listinfo/nep-gth
Game Theory
2017-05-21
Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b1bf227f-53df-4fad-93b8-8bf76d60605b&r=gth
This paper studies egalitarianism in the context of nontransferable utility games by introducing and analyzing the egalitarian value. This new solution concept is based on an egalitarian negotiation procedure in which egalitarian opportunities of coalitions are explicitly taken into account. We formulate conditions under which it leads to a core element and discuss the egalitarian value for the well-known Roth-Shafer examples. Moreover, we characterize the new value on the class of bankruptcy games and bargaining games.
Dietzenbacher, Bas
Borm, Peter
Hendrickx, Ruud
egalitarianism; NTU-games; egalitarian procedure; egalitarian value; egalitarian stability; constrained relative equal awards rule
2017
Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Distributions for Bimatrix Outcome Game Forms
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2017_007&r=gth
We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.
Litan, Cristian
Marhuenda, Francisco
Sudhölter, Peter
Outcome game form; Completely mixed Nash equilibrium; Generic finiteness
2017-05-17
Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01296646&r=gth
We introduce, in the standard exchange economy model, market games in which agents use private prices as strategies. We give conditions on the game form that ensure that the only strict Nash equilibria of the game are the competitive equilibria of the underlying economy. This equivalence result has two main corollaries. First, it adds to the evidence that competitive equilibria can be strategically stable even in small economies. Second, it implies that competitive equilibria have good local stability properties under a large class of evolutionary learning dynamics.
Antoine Mandel
Herbert Gintis
General equilibrium, Market games, Stability, Computational economics, Evolutionary game theory
2016-03-01
Random Dictatorship and the Value in Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01511327&r=gth
In this paper we define a bargaining solution for cooperative games with incomplete information. Our solution concept is inspired in Myerson's (Econometrica, 1983) theory on the informed principal problem and the random dictatorship procedure. It has the essential feature of generalizing the Maschler-Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games. Our main results are individual rationality, incentive (second best) efficiency and existence of our cooperative solution. To obtain these results we restrict our analysis to cooperative games with stochastically independent types, private values and orthogonal coalitions.
Andrés Salamanca
incomplete information,Cooperative games,virtual utility
2017-04-20
Determining models of influence
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01387480&r=gth
We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. Each player modifies his opinion by arbitrarily aggregating the current opinion of all players. A player is influential on another player if the opinion of the first one matters to the latter. A generalization of an influential player to a coalition whose opinion matters to a player is called an influential coalition. Influential players (coalitions) can be graphically represented by the graph (hypergraph) of influence, and convergence analysis is based on properties of the hypergraphs of influence. In the paper, we focus on the practical issues of applicability of the model w.r.t. a standard framework for opinion formation driven by Markov chain theory. For a qualitative analysis of convergence, knowing the aggregation functions of the players is not required, one only needs to know the set of influential coalitions for each player. We propose simple algorithms that permit us to fully determine the influential coalitions. We distinguish three cases: the symmetric decomposable model, the anonymous model, and the general model. JEL Classification: C7, D7, D85
Michel Grabisch
Agnieszka Rusinowska
algorithm,social network,opinion formation,aggregation function,influential coalition
2016
Fluid intelligence and cognitive reflection in a strategic environment: evidence from dominance-solvable games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01359231&r=gth
Dominance solvability is one of the most straightforward solution concepts in game theory. It is based on two principles: dominance (according to which players always use their dominant strategy) and iterated dominance (according to which players always act as if others apply the principle of dominance). However, existing experimental evidence questions the empirical accuracy of dominance solvability. In this study, we study the relationships between the key facets of dominance solvability and two cognitive skills, cognitive reection and uid intelligence. We provide evidence that the behaviors in accordance with dominance and one-step iterated dominance are both predicted by one's uid intelligence rather than cognitive reection. Individual cognitive skills, however, only explain a small fraction of the observed failure of dominance solvability. The accuracy of theoretical predictions on strategic decision making thus not only depends on individual cognitive characteristics, but also, perhaps more importantly, on the decision making environment itself.
Nobuyuki Hanaki
Nicolas Jacquemet
Stéphane Luchini
Adam Zylbersztejn
Raven's test,experiment,Dominance solvability,cognitive skills,CRT
2016
Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01297600&r=gth
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game property (RGP), the reconfirmation property (RCP) for suitably generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of all bounded faces of the positive core, is characterized similarly. Just RCP has to be replaced by a suitable weaker axiom, a weak version of CRGP (the converse RGP) has to be added, and CLOS can be deleted. For classical games the prenucleolus is the unique further solution that satisfies the axioms, but for games with precedence constraints it violates NE as well as the prekernel. The positive prekernel, however, is axiomatized by NE, anonymity, reasonableness, the weak RGP, CRGP, and weak unanimity for two-person games (WUTPG), and the bounded positive prekernel is axiomatized similarly by requiring WUTPG only for classical two-person games and adding BOUND.
Michel Grabisch
Peter Sudhölter
TU games,restricted cooperation,game with precedence constraints,positive core,bounded core,positive prekernel,prenucleolus
2016
When Is Social Learning Path-Dependent?
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:78962&r=gth
In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances they are path-dependent. Our main result shows that a population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state, provided that the expected number of actions observed by each agent is less than one. Moreover, in any environment in which the expected number of observed actions is more than one, there is a learning rule for which the initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior.
Heller, Yuval
Mohlin, Erik
Social learning, steady state, path dependence.
2017-04-28
Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01513384&r=gth
In a two-sided matching context we show how we can predict stable matchings by considering only one side's preferences and the mutually acceptable pairs of agents. Our methodology consists of identifying impossible matches, i.e., pairs of agents that can never be matched together. We use our results to analyze data from the French academic job market and show that the strict preferences of candidates over positions, unobserved and submitted at the final stage of the market, matter very little in the final matching.
Guillaume Haeringer
Vincent Iehlé
Stable matchings, Hall's marriage theorem, French academic job market
2017-04-26
Interactive Epistemology in Simple Dynamic Games with a Continuum of Strategies
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:602&r=gth
We extend the epistemic analysis of dynamic games of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, 2002, 2007) from finite dynamic games to all simple games, that is, fi nite and infi nite-horizon games with finite action sets at non-terminal stages and compact action sets at terminal stages. We prove a generalization of Lubins (1974) extension result to deal with conditional probability systems and strong belief. With this, we can provide a short proof of the following result: in every simple dynamic game, strong rationalizability characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality and common strong belief in rationality. Keywords: Epistemic game theory, simple in finite dynamic game, strong belief, strong rationalizability.
Pierpaolo Battigalli
Gabriele Beneduci
Pietro Tebaldi
2017
Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1001&r=gth
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object, transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for quasilinear type space, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear type spaces, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain type spaces with positive income effect.
Tomoya Kazumura
Debasis Mishra
Shigehiro Serizawa
2017-05
A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01387467&r=gth
We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general functional form for agents' utility that incorporates both the effects of distance and of neighbors' degree. Consequently, we introduce a framework that can be seen as a degree-distance-based connections model with both negative and positive externalities. Our analysis shows how the introduction of negative externalities modifies certain results about stability and efficiency compared to the original connections model. In particular, we see the emergence of new stable structures, such as a star with links between peripheral nodes. We also identify structures, for example, certain disconnected networks, that are efficient in our model but which could not be efficient in the original connections model. While our results are proved for the general utility function, some of them are illustrated by using a specific functional form of the degree-distance-based utility.
Philipp Moehlmeier
Agnieszka Rusinowska
Emily Tanimura
distance, connections model,network, externality, degree
2016-04