Game Theory
http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-gth
Game Theory2014-10-13László Á. KóczyGeneral Equilibrium Analysis of Bio-Energy Options
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:002596:259600161&r=gth
Adolf STROOMBERGEN, Peter HALLRevenue Equivalence Revisited: Bounded Rationality in Auctions
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:003306:330600118&r=gth
Konrad RICHTERStatic and Dynamic Networks in Interbank Markets
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1408&r=gth
This paper proposes a model of network interactions in the interbank market. Our innovation is to model systemic risk in the interbank network as the propagation of incentives or strategic behavior rather than the propagation of losses after default. Transmission in our model is not based on default. Instead, we explain bank profitability based on competition incentives and the outcome of a strategic game. As competitors’ lending decisions change, banks adjust their own decisions as a result: generating a ‘transmission’ of shocks through the system. We provide a unique equilibrium characterization of a static model, and embed this model into a full dynamic model of network formation. We also determine the key bank, which is the bank that is crucial for the stability of the financial network.Ethan Cohen-Cole, Eleonora Patacchini, Yves Zenou2014A Game Theory Model of Inverse Pricing Strategy
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:000238:23800066&r=gth
Ying KONG, Hsiao-Chan WANGA new solution for the roommate problem. The Q-stable matchings
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:wpaper:14/04&r=gth
The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict preferences. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2]) and maximum stable matchings (Tan [30] [32]). We nd that almost stable matchings are incompatible with the other two solutions. Hence, to solve the roommate problem we propose matchings that lie at the intersection of the maximum irreversible matchings and maximum stable matchings, which are called Q-stable matchings. These matchings are core consistent and we oer an ecient algorithm for computing one of them. The outcome of the algorithm belongs to an absorbing setPeter Biro, Elena Iñarra, Elena Molis2014-09-23Cost allocation;The Process of Establishing Cooperation in the Production Chain: Design and Use of a Partnership Game
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ekd:002721:272100094&r=gth
Ger Trip, Woody MaijersCSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-19&r=gth
We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo- poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.Luca Lambertini, Arsen Palestini, Alessandro Tampieri2014Capital accumulation, asymmetric duopoly, dynamic games