Game Theory
http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-gth
Game Theory2014-07-28Laszlo A. KoczyStrategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtl:montde:2014-02&r=gth
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents' preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core notions were proposed. One is the gamma-core whereby blocking is only allowed via allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying ‘individual rationality’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘strategy-proofness’, then for any problem for which the gamma-core is non-empty, the allocation rule must choose a gamma-core allocation and all agents are indifferent between all allocations in the gamma-core. We apply our result to housing markets, coalition formation and networks.EHLERS, Lars2014General allocation problems, Externalities, Strategy-proofness, Gamma-coreA Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57336&r=gth
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.Aryal, Gaurab, Stauber, Ronald2014-06-17Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; Dynamic consistencyStructural Estimation of Sequential Games of Complete Information
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osu:osuewp:14-01&r=gth
In models of strategic interaction, there may be important order of entry effects if one player can credibly commit to an action (e.g., entry) before other players. If one estimates a simultaneous-move model, then the move-order effects will be confounded with the payoffs. This paper considers nonparametric identification and simulation-based estimation of sequential games of complete information. Relative to simultaneous-move games, these models avoid the problem of multiple equilibria and require fewer payoff normalizations. We apply the estimator in several Monte Carlo experiments and to study entry-order effects using data from the airline industry.Jason R. Blevins2014-07static games, sequential games, identification, simulation-based estimation, airline industryRecursive Lexicographical Search: Finding all Markov Perfect Equilibria of Finite State Directional Dynamic Games
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1416&r=gth
We define a class of dynamic Markovian games that we call directional dynamic games (DDG) in which directionality is represented by a partial order on the state space. We propose a fast and robust state recursion algorithm that can find a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) via backward induction on the state space of the game. When there are multiple equilibria, this algorithm relies on an equilibrium selection rule (ESR) to pick a particular MPE.We propose a recursive lexicographic search (RLS) algorithm that systematically and efficiently cycles through all feasible ESRs and prove that the RLS algorithm finds all MPE of the overall game. We apply the algorithms to find all MPE of a dynamic duopoly model of Bertrand price competition and cost reducing investments which we show is a DDG. Even with coarse discretization of the state space we find hundreds of millions of MPE in this game.Fedor Iskhakov, John Rust, Bertel Schjerning, Jean-Robert Tyran2014-06-01Dynamic games, directional dynamic games, Markov-perfect equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, multiple equilibria, partial orders, directed acyclic graphs, d-subgames, generalized stage games, state recursion, recursive lexicographic search algorithm, variable-base arithmetic, successor functionDelayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:faseco:11880354&r=gth
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in â€œdelayed-response strategies,â€ which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information.Fudenberg, Drew, Ishii, Yuhta, Kominers, Scott Duke2014Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:faseco:11923167&r=gth
We explore the extent to which altruism, as measured by giving in a dictator game (DG), accounts for play in a noisy version of the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We find that DG giving is correlated with cooperation in the repeated game when no cooperative equilibria exist, but not when cooperation is an equilibrium. Furthermore, none of the commonly observed strategies are better explained by inequity aversion or efficiency concerns than money maximization. Various survey questions provide additional evidence for the relative unimportance of social preferences. We conclude that cooperation in repeated games is primarily motivated by long-term payoff maximization and that even though some subjects may have other goals, this does not seem to be the key determinant of how play varies with the parameters of the repeated game. In particular, altruism does not seem to be a major source of the observed diversity of play.Dreber-Almenberg, Anna, Fudenberg, Drew, Rand, David G.2014Bribing in First-Price Auctions: Corrigendum
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:hksfac:10591649&r=gth
We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to participate in an independent-private-value first-price, sealed bid auction for one indivisible object. After the risk-neutral players learn their valuations but prior to the actual auction, player 1 can offer a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) bribe to his opponent in exchange for the opponent dropping out of the contest. If the offer is accepted, player 1 is the only bidder and obtains the item for free; otherwise, both players compete non-cooperatively in the auction as usual. This is called the first-price TIOLI game.1 R13 shows that under the restriction to continuous and monotonic bribing strategies for player 1, any equilibrium of this game must be trivialâ€”the equilibrium bribing function employed by player 1, if it is continuous and non-decreasing, must be identically zero. In this note, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which a trivial equilibrium exists. These are less stringent than originally proposed.Kotowski, Maciej Henryk, Rachmilevitch, Shiran2013Canonical correlation and assortative matching: A remark
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2014-10&r=gth
In the context of the Beckerian theory of marriage, where men and women match on a single-dimensional index that is the weighted sum of their respective multivariate attributes, many papers in the literature have used linear canonical correlation, and related techniques, in order to estimate these weights. We argue that this estimation technique is inconsistent and suggest some solutions.DUPUY Arnaud, GALICHON Alfred2014-07matching; marriage; assortative matching; assignment; canonical correlationCountervailing Conflict Interventions as a (Potentially Preventable) Prisoner’s Dilemma Outcome
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56955&r=gth
Scholars and policymakers have devoted much attention to issues of third party intervention in conflict. The present paper considers a conflict that draws two countervailing outside interveners. As in the realist perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through some economic or geostrategic interest that would be promoted through the victory of an ally. Using a simple game theoretic model, I find conditions under which outside interveners fall prey to a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome and become worse off through their own intervention. This result brings into question the desirability of escalatory conflict intervention. The paper also studies conditions required for the United Nations, or some such supra-national institution, to prevent a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome and successfully deter escalatory bilateral intervention. The findings show that the United Nations can alter the game equilibrium, and deter escalatory intervention, by imposing sufficient costs on the intervening parties.Dulal, Rajendra2013-10Conflict, Prisoner's Dilemma , Game theoryReciprocity Networks and the Participation Problem
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:521&r=gth
Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars argue that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this. Our analysis uncovers an intricate web of nuances that demonstrate the attainable yet elusive nature of a unique outcome.Keywords: Discrete public good, participation, reciprocity networks, coordination, cost-sharing JEL codes: C72, D03, H41.Martin Dufwenberg, Amrish Patel2014Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2014-05&r=gth
We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with third party punishment, we find groups punish more when the penalty embeds deterrence than when it can only be retributive. In contrast, individual third parties’ punishment decisions do not vary on whether the punishment has any deterrent effect. In general, third party groups are less likely to impose punishment than individuals even though the punishment is costless for third parties.Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao2014-05third-party punishment, group decision making, retribution, deterrence, social dilemmas, experimentI Cannot Cheat on You after We Talk
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0001&r=gth
This is a draft of a chapter in a planned book on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, edited by Martin Peterson, to be published by Cambridge University Press. - Experimental evidence on pre-play communication supports a “focusing function of communication” hypothesis. Relevant communication facilitates cooperative, pro-social behavior because it causes a shift in individuals’ focus towards strategies dictated by some salient social norm. After reviewing the formal foundations for a general theory of conformity to social norms, we provide an original application illustrating how a framework that allows for different conjectures about norms is able to capture the focusing function of communication and to explain experimental results.Cristina Bicchieri, Alessandro Sontuoso, , 2014-07social norms, social dilemmasOn the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hrv:hksfac:11718166&r=gth
We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed.Li, Fei, Kotowski, Maciej Henryk2014Behavior in Contests
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57451&r=gth
Standard theoretical prediction is that rational economic agents participating in rent-seeking contests should engage in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly efforts. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted and that over-dissipation of rents (or overbidding or over-expenditure of resources) can occur. Although the standard theory cannot explain over-dissipation, this phenomenon can be explained by incorporating behavioral dimensions into the rent-seeking contest, such as (1) the utility of winning, (2) relative payoff maximization, (3) bounded rationality, and (4) judgmental biases. These explanations are not exhaustive, but they provide a coherent picture of important behavioral dimensions that should be considered when studying rent-seeking behavior in theory and in practice.Sheremeta, Roman2014-07-01rent-seeking, contests, experiments, overbidding, over-dissipationSemiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auction Models
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57340&r=gth
We propose a semiparametric estimator within the class of indirect methods. Specifically, we model private valuations through a set of conditional moment restrictions. Our econometric model calls for a two step procedure. In the first step we recover a sample of pseudo private values while using a Local Polynomial Estimator. In the second step we use a GMM procedure to obtain an estimate for the parameter of interest. The proposed semiparametric estimator is shown to have desirable statistical properties namely, it is consistent and has an asymptotic normal distribution. Moreover, the estimator attains the parametric rate of convergence.Aryal, Gaurab, Gabrielli, Maria F., Vuong, Quang2014-07-12Auctions, Structural Approach, Semiparametric Estimator, Local Polynomial, GMM.