Economic Design
http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-des
Economic Design
2018-04-16
Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cty:dpaper:17/05&r=des
Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for random assignments. Moreover, we show that a constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold.
Schlegel, J. C.
Matching; Random Assignments; Priority-based Allocation; Constrained Efficiency; Pseudo-Market
2017
Mechanisms in a digitalized world
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01715951&r=des
Due to computing and communication facilities, formal procedures, often referred to as 'al-gorithms', are now extensively used in public, economic and social areas. These procedures, currently at the forefront of criticisms, share some features with mechanisms as defined by economists, following Hurwicz. My aim is to investigate these relationships and to discuss the risks due to the power of algorithms.
Gabrielle Demange
mechanisms, algorithms, algorithmic pricing and trading, social choice rule, data,Admission post-bac APB,JEL codes: D44, D47, D71, D82
2018
Weak fairness and the Shapley value
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/306979&r=des
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) has been axiomatically characterized from different points of view. Van den Brink (2001) proposes a characterization by means of efficiency, fairness and the null player property. In this paper, we characterize the family of single-valued solutions obtained by relaxing fairness into weak fairness. To point out the Shapley value, we impose the additional axiom of weak self consistency and strengthen the null player property into the dummy player property.
Calleja, Pere
Llerena Garrés, Francesc
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), 33 - Economia,
2018
Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:87219&r=des
This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched to whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker firm pair reach agreement they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask when do such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficiencies { mismatch and delay { often feature. Mismatch occurs whenever an agent's bargaining position is at risk of deteriorating. Delay occurs whenever agents expect their bargaining position to improve. Delay can be extensive and structured with vertically differentiated markets endogenously clearing from the top down.
Elliott, Matt
Nava, Francesco
2018-02-08
Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d'allocation centralisée
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:32556&r=des
Magnac, Thierry
Education; matching; mechanism design; applied econometrics
2018-03-16
Identification in One-to-One Matching Models with Nonparametric Unobservables
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:32540&r=des
This paper considers a one-to-one matching model with transferable utilities, in two-sided markets. In the model, the agents have preferences over some observable agent characteristics (called types) on the other side of the market. There are other observed characteristics aggregated at the level of types that determine the systematic preferences over these types. These systematic preferences enter the agent utilities in the form of a linear index. Agents also have idiosyncratic taste shocks. This paper shows the identification of systematic preference parameters over types, without making any parametric assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved taste shocks. The matching model reduces to two separate discrete-choice problems linked together by market clearing conditions, satisfied in the presence of equilibrium transfers. However, transfers are endogenous and unobserved which makes the discrete-choice problem non-standard. This paper gives conditions under which transfers are simply functions of the linear indices. This insight along with variation across i.i.d. markets is used to reduce the matching model to a semiparametric multi-index model with an unknown link function. Identification is shown under appropriate exclusion restrictions on the regressors.
Sinha, Shruti
One-to-One Matching; Transfers; Identification
2018-03